@article{Stouras_Erat_Lichtendahl_2024_DuelingContests,
title={Dueling {C}ontests and {P}latform’s {C}oordinating {R}ole},
author={Stouras, Konstantinos I. and Erat, Sanjiv and Lichtendahl Jr, Kenneth C.},
journal={Management {S}cience},
year={2024},
publisher={INFORMS}
}
Abstract: Crowdsourcing platforms typically take a passive approach, and they let the competing firms freely design their own contests and allow every solver to self-select and join any of the concurrently running contests. In a model of competing noise-driven contests, we show that the duopoly prize allocation has fewer (but larger) prizes compared with a monopolist contest designer. We also find that contests with firm-chosen budgets and solvers’ endogenous participation create coordination inefficiencies. Thus, platform policies that constrain the competing firms from freely choosing their budgets and offer solvers non-enforceable recommendations toward specific noise-driven contests strictly enhance total welfare. Extending our framework to include arbitrarily correlated ability-driven contests, we highlight the critical role of inter-contest dependence on the efficacy of a platform’s interventions. Specifically, platform nudges to improve solver-contest (mis)matches are welfare enhancing only when the contests are sufficiently related, and allowing solvers to self-sort is appropriate otherwise.
@article{Stouras_Krupat_Chao_2022_contestParticipation,
title={The {R}ole of {P}articipation in {I}nnovation {C}ontests},
author={Stouras, Konstantinos I. and Hutchison-Krupat, Jeremy and Chao, Raul O.},
journal={Management {S}cience},
volume={68},
number={6},
pages={4135--4150},
year={2022},
publisher={INFORMS}
}
Abstract: Many firms use external contests to obtain solutions to their innovation challenges. A central managerial concern is how to screen the population for only the most capable people when the capability of the population is not known. If the manager sets the bar too high, then the contest could fail, leaving the firm to suffer the consequences. Alternatively, if the bar is set too low, then too many people enter, which leads to increased competition, a lack of effort, and diminished performance, again leaving the firm to suffer the consequences. We study a situation in which the number of solvers in a population is known but the ability of each individual is not. At best, the firm can deduce the probability that any number of solvers would enter and the probability that any solver who enters would possess a specific ability. We derive the optimal contest design to maximize the performance of the best submission while accounting for the possibility that the contest receives an insufficient number of entries, resulting in an unproductive contest. Our results provide an alternative rationale for why many contests offer multiple awards: firms want to avoid an unproductive contest and the negative consequences associated with it. We also consider alternative levers available to the firm when facing uncertain participation. These include the establishment of performance thresholds and the decision to expand the potential solver population.
I have been teaching a number of modules on a diverse set of topics including Project Management, Operations and Supply Chain Management, Business Analytics, Platform Strategy, and Business Model Transformation. Here is a recent list of modules taught:
In addition, I am highly interested in developing modern pedagogical materials such as Case Studies, Simulations, and interactive Games
to support student learning. All my cases below are available at Harvard Business Review (or similar case distributors) and are accompanied
by a detailed Teaching Note and Excel Sheet; instructor copies are available upon request.